[{"_1":2,"_126":-5,"_127":-5},"loaderData",{"_3":4,"_9":10},"root",{"_5":6,"_7":8},"locale","id","isCms",false,"routes/tags/$slug",{"_11":12,"_13":14,"_15":16,"_113":114,"_120":116,"_124":119,"_125":-5},"slug","undersea-cable-security","ads",[],"posts",[17],{"_6":18,"_19":20,"_11":21,"_22":23,"_24":25,"_26":27,"_28":29,"_30":31,"_32":33,"_34":35,"_36":37,"_38":39,"_40":41,"_42":43,"_44":45,"_46":45,"_47":48,"_49":50,"_51":52,"_53":54,"_55":56,"_57":58,"_59":60,"_110":111,"_67":112},"019c84cf-b2c4-71f8-9f6e-62866c679644","title","Opinion – From Taiwan’s experience to international solutions: Building a more resilient global undersea cable security network through the RISK Initiative","opinion-from-taiwans-experience-to-international-solutions-building-a-more-resilient-global-undersea-cable-security-network-through-the-risk-initiative","main_id","019bb73f-2a0a-7148-bb19-627580f190e4","main_name","Sci-Tech","main_slug","sci-tech-en","date","2026-02-22 00:00:00","author_id","019bb745-b426-73a2-9a49-5ddcb6765ea0","author_name","indowin","full_name","Indonesia Window","author_firstname","Indonesia","author_slug","indonesiawindow","content","

In recent years, a number of undersea cables and key energy pipelines across Europe and the northern Atlantic region have suffered man-made damage, putting governments on high alert. Frequent incidents involving broken cables have also occurred in Asia and Pacific island nations, prompting the launch of local emergency backup and risk response mechanisms. Such matters have repeatedly reminded us that in this digital era, it is not only data centers that support global operations; a network of cables stretching thousands of kilometers deep under the sea is also crucial. Moreover, the survival of many nations depends on the lifeline provided by energy and power lines.

Whoever controls the flow of information can influence how the world operates. And whoever controls energy and power can more or less decide the fate of nations. Undersea cables are an extremely crucial, yet often overlooked, element of the infrastructure making up the world of today.

Undersea cable security is a national security and geopolitical concern

Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing global outlook, a fundamental shift has occurred in the perception of undersea cables—especially for Taiwan, which relies heavily on undersea communications and power and energy lines to support its digital economy and citizens’ livelihoods. The security of undersea cables is not only a technological or industrial issue; undersea cables are a strategic asset of great importance to national security, resilience, and geopolitics.

In recent years, several cases of damage to undersea cables have occurred in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and particularly the Taiwan Strait, of a frequency and form that have attracted significant attention and shown that ongoing risks to such cables continue to rise. Successive cases occurred at the beginning of 2025. Damage was caused to international cables in the waters off Keelung by the Shunxing 39, a Cameroon-flagged freighter with Chinese links. And the Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 undersea cable was cut by the Hong Tai 58, a Togo-flagged cargo ship operated with Chinese funds. As a means of engaging in gray-zone harassment and hybrid threats, doing damage to undersea cables is a low-cost ploy that has a high impact on the functioning of society and affects a nation’s domestic and overseas linkages.

Even more alarmingly, in the political and legal domains, China is misrepresenting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in an attempt to forcibly link this issue with that of its so-called “one China principle.” It is suppressing Taiwan’s international participation and constraining other nations’ freedom to pursue their own interests with the intention of isolating Taiwan and creating a legal basis for a future invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, through a range of methods taking place in the air, at sea, and under the sea, China is unilaterally changing the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

In the air, China has unilaterally imposed new flight routes and carried out military exercises in a bid to obstruct Taiwan’s air links with the outside world. At sea, China aims to block the freedom of navigation operations conducted by international military vessels and make the Taiwan Strait its own internal waters, which would impact the movement of global seaborne cargo. And under the sea, through its efforts to cut off Taiwan proper from Taiwan’s outlying islands, and even to sever Taiwan’s international undersea cable connections, China is attempting to impede the flow of both information and capital.

These actions not only threaten Taiwan’s security but also pose huge risks to regional stability and worldwide digital networks. Taiwan serves as a key link in global supply chains. Severing any of Taiwan’s links to the outside world may not just leave Taiwan isolated; it could also break connections between various locations around the world, generating massive global upheaval. Indeed, damage to undersea cables, and the resultant affect upon capital and information flows, could generate an unbearable shock, impacting the highly digitalized, information-oriented global economic system that is currently witnessing the development of AI.

Responding to risks with institutional frameworks: transforming Taiwan’s experience into international solutions

In facing authoritarian forces’ increasingly frequent use of gray-zone tactics, which aim to disrupt the international order and threaten the security of critical infrastructure, Taiwan has chosen to respond to the risks head-on through institutional frameworks and cooperation. Recently, the Legislative Yuan passed the third reading of amendments to seven laws put forward by the Executive Yuan designed to comprehensively strengthen the protection, management, and related enforcement mechanisms of undersea cables and pipelines. These legal measures will serve to deter malicious damage and regulatory violations against undersea cables, addressing long-standing security challenges while underscoring the government’s commitment to undersea cable security as a core pillar of national resilience.

In parallel, Taiwan is exploring ways to translate its own experience into policy solutions that can be shared with the global community. In October 2025, at the Taiwan-Europe Undersea Cable Security Forum cohosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European chapter of the Formosa Club, I proposed the RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables. The initiative received support from 42 parliamentarians representing 18 European countries and was incorporated into the joint statement adopted at the Formosa Club’s annual summit in Taipei. This move symbolized Taiwan’s evolution from a party affected by related issues into a proactive actor proposing institutional initiatives.

The RISK Initiative: building a more resilient international undersea cable security network

The RISK Initiative focuses on addressing risk through the provision of four mutually supportive policy goals: first, risk mitigation, which seeks to enhance emergency repair and backup capabilities through transnational coordination; second, information sharing, which involves establishing threat intelligence exchanges and early warning mechanisms; third, systemic reform, which aims to review deficiencies in current international and domestic regulations when addressing hybrid threats; and fourth, knowledge building, which focuses on comprehensively improving protection and resilience through professional training and practical exchanges at an international level. These four pillars, which are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, have the ultimate objective of creating a more resilient and sustainable international undersea cable security network.

To translate vision into action, Taiwan has designed a multilayered, cooperative pathway that will incrementally advance institutional frameworks and substantive cooperation. We look forward to working with like-minded partners to build a resilient undersea cable security network and ensure that undersea cables become a commonly protected global public good rather than a point of vulnerability for democratic societies. At a parliamentary level, we are communicating closely with such countries as the United States, Japan, and Australia, as well as European nations, through our overseas missions, securing political support and promoting the inclusion of undersea cable security in pro-Taiwan resolutions. This will allow the issue to become part of a policy agenda common to democratic partners.

At the administrative and law enforcement levels, we seek to work with international coast guard and undersea cable authorities to conduct exchanges and establish long-term cooperation mechanisms. This includes the exchange of information on substandard vessels and the sharing of intelligence regarding vulnerable cables, which would enhance early warning and response capabilities. It also involves promoting the development and application of technologies that can facilitate the maintenance of undersea cable security and utilizing technology to assist in law enforcement.

In terms of policy and institutional development, Taiwan is placing the RISK Initiative at the center of its efforts, collaborating with domestic and international think tanks and experts to deepen consensus through seminars and professional exchanges. Furthermore, by leveraging the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, Taiwan will call on experts from a range of nations to jointly examine tangible measures for preventing and mitigating risks to undersea cables. We are also facilitating overseas exchanges for our experts and scholars so that they can share their experiences of maintenance, repair, and law enforcement with like-minded partners, thereby laying the solid foundation of expertise and trust needed for long-term cooperation.

Safeguarding undersea cables will ensure the connectivity of the democratic community

In recent years, democratic nations—including those of the European Union, as well as the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Australia—have all identified undersea cables as being critical infrastructure vital to national security and the global digital order. They have sought to strengthen related protections through legislation, action plans, and transnational cooperation.

Undersea cables are more than merely infrastructure; they are a public good within the global digital economy and serve as lifelines in connecting democratic societies. Taiwan is willing and able to serve as a pivotal node within the global undersea cable security network and work hand in hand with like-minded partners so as to jointly safeguard these critical arteries that sustain operations throughout the world.

End

Author: Lin Chia-lung [Minister of Foreign Affairs ROC (Taiwan)]

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